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Every attempt to discuss American-European relations without taking the war in Iraq into account is doomed to fail. Analysts who exclude Iraq or insist that the Americans have already lost do not understand how much is at stake. An early withdrawal of the USA will boost international terrorism around the globe.  
  I would even go so far as to argue that the nature of the future international order will be determined by the outcome of the Iraq war. It is in Iraq, therefore, that the shape of the future world order is determined. This is exactly the reason why French, German and Russian policy makers are so nervous. They know very well that a policy of blunt anti-americanism will not serve their long term interests in the Middle East as well as elsewhere. Still, domestic reasons force them to endorse heavy handed policies.   


The war in Iraq

The war in Iraq has put considerable strain on the relations between the US and the rest of the world. This is a deeply tragic development because it is difficult to see how the world can effectively combat terrorism without cooperation between the US and the rest of the world. If we want to analyze how this sorrow state of events has come about some issues need to be  addressed:
1.	what has actually happened in the months preceding the attack on Iraq? Who is guilty and for what? I will argue that on the basis of the existing body of knowledge the Allied coalition had little choice other than invading Iraq. I would even go so far to argue that by doing so the coalition forces have rescued the international order
1.	This is not to say that all the assumptions of the neo-cons on the nature of the international order are unproblematic. Especially their focus on the need to export democracy in order to combat terrorism creates all kinds of practical problems. The direction seems okay but its implementation is incompatible with unilateralism and half-hearted nation building 
1.	Where to proceed from here? I will argue that the USA has to make an effort to develop some form of international cooperation in order to increase the legitimacy of their interventions. After all, the diplomatic leverage of the USA in the world depends not only on raw power but also on legitimacy. At the same time, the other players in the international arena should realize that anti-americanism only produces a divided world. At the end of the day, they should understand that security in the world cannot be attained without US involvement. It seems therefore wise, that the critics of American policy cease America bashing and try to contribute intellectually to policy approaches to combat terrorism within the parameters set by the largest power in the world. This decision is not only of a Machiavellian nature. It seems to me that a only a realist Wilsonian approach to international affairs can really deal with the problems with which we are confronted since 9/11 

Ad 1. What has actually happened? Who is guilty?  

In the autumn and winter of 2002/2003 things went terribly wrong. American diplomats were unable to convince a host of important countries amongst them France, Germany and Russia that Saddam had to go. The American administration did put considerable pressure on these countries by suggesting that they would go alone if the UN would fail to implement resolution 1441. That gave these countries an easy way out by refusing to accept the American fait accompli. Rumsfeld’s remarks about old Europe only served to consolidate disagreement.
  This being said, the obstruction policy of France, Germany and Russia was not very helpful either. Even with the benefit of hindsight that there were no weapons and that the link between Saddam and 11 september was far-fetched, there was still a strong case to remove Saddam: 

1.	although resolution 1441 was not a war resolution it was unacceptable even from a legal   point of view that Saddam could endlessly go on with cheating he UN. That would undermine the credibility of the UN even more than American unilateralism. But it was not illegal. U.N. Security Council Resolution 1441, passed by unanimous vote in November 2002, made it clear that the then status quo in Iraq was illegal. Saddam had already violated some 17 previous resolutions demanding his verifiable disarmament. He was put on notice by Resolution 1441 that continuing this was emphatically unacceptable. And while inspectors did make progress in Iraq in the ensuing weeks of late 2002 and early 2003, they hardly resolved all questions. Iraq's compliance then remained imperfect at best, as chief U.N. weapons inspector Hans Blix has noted. Colin Powell reportedly became incensed on Jan. 20, 2003, when, after many exhausting negotiations at the United Nations, he discovered from Dominique de Villepin, then the French minister of foreign affairs, that Paris thought that “nothing! nothing!” justified the armed enforcement of Resolution 1441 compelling Iraq to yield to U.N. inspections. This, Powell felt, was something that he might well have been told before he wasted his time. But it is also something that he could have known before he wasted that time (and, dare one hint) the time of others, too. In a much underreported speech to France’s assembled ambassadors on Aug. 26, 2004, the new French Minister of Foreign Affairs Michel Barnier said that it was France that has become isolated, even “arrogant,” and that it could not flourish without allies. He was noted for not even mentioning the United States in his cautious remarks. 

2.	the alternative for war, the continuation of containment based on the UN sanctions was reaching a dead end. France and Russia had gone out of their way to undermine containment by helping Saddam to get rid of the sanctions altogether. If containment collapses, war becomes a serious option

2.	It was wrong to assume that Saddam had close contacts with Al Qaida. We now know that Iran has played a much more important role in this respect. It is, however, undeniable, as Walter Russell Mead has pointed out, that there was a causal relationship between Saddam and Al Qaida. American troops presence in Saudi Arabia after the First Gulf War, which has done much to further Bin Ladens case, had clearly become untenable. The existing balance of power therefore was much less stable than those who did reject war wanted us to believe.
  

Ad 2. Flaws in neoconservative thinking

Rumsfeld designed and executed a brilliant military campaign. After the war, however, serious problems emerged:
1.	It emerged that Washington had actually concealed the disagreement in the expert community concerning Saddams weapons. That was a serious problem, especially when it turned out that Saddams arseal was actually rather modest. 
1.	Washington was well aware of the pottery barn rule, if you break it you own it. Powell warned the president on two occasions. Why then was there no serious thinking about the reconstruction phase and why was there so little concern about the need to create a coalition as wide as possible? To be more precise: why were the assumptions of the Pentagon boys decisive during the decision making process? 
1.	Irakization started too late, more than a year was lost
1.	there is no charismatic leader in Iraq representative for the whole country
1.	the borders were not sealed
1.	corruption public contracts, bureaucratic problems concerning the reconstruction funds, no sector specialists with access to markets, and last but not least Abu Ghraib


Some of these problems would not have emerged if some of the neo-conservative assumption had been challenged. Preventive action and democratization is far from easy:
1.	there is tension between preventive action and unilateralism. There is nothing wrong with preventive action if the danger is imminent. The combination of roque states with WMD and globalized terrorism is indeed lethal. However, fighting terrorism effectively requires an immediate danger and a coalition that is as wide as possible
1.	there is tension between nation building and lean military action. The war was brilliantly executed by Rumsfeld but the reconstruction requires considerably more manpower.
1.	there is tension between democratization and stability. Democratization involves a selectivity problem, which dictator first and why, a consistency problem, why depose Saddam and support Musharraf? These problems can be overcome theoretically but they cannot be easily explained to the people in the Middle East 
1.	there is in the short and middle term tension between democratization and the war on terror. Rapid democratization will surely boost terrorism in the short and presumably also middle term. In the long run, however, democratization is the only way to eliminate the breeding ground for terrorism

All these problems in Neo-conservative thinking, however, should not conceal two things. First of all, the Western World is engaged in the Iraq and we have to make the best of it. And secondly, democratization and stability may be difficult to reconcile, it is difficult to see how allowing Iraq become another rogue state would be in the interest of world security. 

Ad 3. Where to proceed from here

In Iraq a catch 22 situation presents itself. Elections can only be held if there is stability and stability can only be attained if elections are held. It seems questionable whether this sorry state of affairs could have been prevented but the mistakes during the reconstruction stage were clearly not helpful. It is difficult to see how the situation in Iraq could improve without holding elections. It is simply the only way to increase legitimacy even if the Sunnis will boycott it. The election will de a defining moment of truth in the sense that it will presumably demonstrate that the majority of the Shiites and Kurds support some form of democracy. The radical Shiites and the Sunnis clearly constitute a minority and they will have to be made to understand that the price of continued warfare is higher than joining the legitimate political process. The only way to guarantee the rights of the Sunni minority is a constitutional process, not a new dictator. If this analysis cuts ice it leads to the following conclusions:

1.	Claiming that terrorism in Iraq cannot be destroyed with military means is only one side of the coin. Obviously, fighting terrorism requires the destruction of bad elements without losing the hearts and the minds of good elements. Asking the Americans now to stop their military actions will only strengthen the unholy alliance of foreign jihadists, ex-baathists and other elements. And that will only produce more chaos
1.	The comments of the Secretary General of the UN and some European leaders, therefore, were not helpful. Supporting the democratization process cannot exclude military actions
1.	Europe should do more to combat terrorism. If France and Germany don’t deliver in Iraq. Why are they not prepared to send more troops to Afghanistan? 6500 troops is not sufficient to stabilize the country
1.	Instead of criticizing America Europe should engage intellectually with the merits of a realist and more patient Wilsonianism. This means trying to establish with the Americans international institutions dealing with the concept of preventive warfare. It is questionable whether the UN will deliver here. It seems worthwhile to think seriously about the creation of an alliance of democratic states. At the same time realist Wilsonianism could deal with the problems of selectivity, consistency. We cannot push Egypt, Pakistan and even Turkey to hard since this would surely be counterproductive. 
1.	In the short term, all states, democratic or not, that have an interest in a stable Iraq should be convened and asked how they could help us out. Kissinger proposed a week ago: Egypt, Russia, Algeria, India. I would like to add Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Japan, Kuwait and perhaps even China.
1.	The EU should realize that it is not in its interest if the Americans get bogged down in the Middle East. It is also against its interests if the American economy collapses under the twin deficits. Therefore, Europe and other countries should spend more militarily and the Americans should raise taxes 
1.	Carrots and stick in Iran and North Korea, Take their security interests into account and formulate a concerted US, EU, China, Japan, Russia approach. Economics and diplomacy. Bombing solves nothing
1.	EU and America have joint objectives: a peaceful Iraq, access to oil, preventing Iran from going nuclear, and a viable non-violent Palestinian state. The chances of achieving these common goals are better if we work together.
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